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PRINCIPAL C ONCLUSIONS
1.  Under the new regulatory regime for imposing obligations on firms with SNP (significant
market power):
§  Market definition should not be too narrow and it should take into account foreseeable
changes in market conditions;
§  The use of as yet undefined concepts such as collective dominance and leveraging to assess
SMP creates considerable uncertainty about the regulatory outcome; and
§  Insufficient attention has been paid to which form of remedy is appropriate for the different
problems giving rise to SMP. Many of the remedies listed in the Access Directive are useful
only in case of persistent monopoly (e.g. local loop).
2. The new regulatory regime, as regards SMP, while more sophisticated, will remain
unpredictable in particular cases.
3. NRAs (national regulatory agencies) are likely to be overburdened with their new roles. In
order to make the new regime predictable and consistent within the EU, it is vital that the
Commission play a strong coordinating role.
4. The version of Article 6 of the Framework Directive contained in the common position of the
Council is inadequate for lack of a ‘hard’ power on the part of the Commission.
5. Article 6 of the Framework Directive could be improved by:
§  Requiring NRAs I) to indicate in their draft measures already how they took into account
the relevant decisions and other pronouncements of the Commission and other NRAs, with
a justification for departing therefrom, as the case may be and ii) to consult the NCA
(national competition authority) before circulating a draft measure.
§  Requiring the Commission, before taking a formal decision on an NRA measure, to consult
a committee made up of representatives from the NRAs.
6. The scope of Article 6 of the Framework Directive must also include measures relating to
radio spectrum (Article 8(3), (4) and (5) of the Framework Directive).
7. The current set of proposals does not achieve internal market objectives, and there seems to
be a lack of concern about that point.
8. The Authorisation Directive leaves too much room for fragmentation, even though individual
licenses are removed (e.g. different scope for general authorisations from one member state to
the other).
9. The new regulatory framework misses the broader perspective. It still clashes with other
directives such as the Television Without Frontiers and E-Commerce Directives.
10. The new regulatory framework neglects the relationship between content and electronic
communications.ii
E XECUTIVE S UMMARY
ommunity institutions are now busy with the second readings of the proposals
for a new regime for regulating the European communications industry. While
many aspects of the proposed new regulatory arrangements are widely accepted,
a number of key choices still have to be made. The regulation of European
communications is therefore at a crossroads.
This CEPS Working Party concentrated its work on those key choices lying ahead, with
the aim of providing the institutions with some fresh input from well placed observers,
at a time when discussions risk being bogged down in detailed issues of wording, at the
expense of the broader perspective. It came to the following conclusions.
1.  The SMP framework and the scale of intervention
The new regime is intended to operate as a sui generis form of competition policy.
Where national regulatory agencies (NRAs) find firms with significant market power
(SMP) as a result of a market analysis, they are required to intervene, choosing from a
list of remedies specified in the draft legislation. Since markets are increasingly found
not to contain firms with significant market power (and hence to be effectively
competitive), this kind of intervention is abandoned and reliance is placed instead on the
application of national and European competition law, which operates once an abuse of
dominance has been found. The regulatory system thus contains automatic market-by-
market sunset clauses.
This proposed regime imposes heavy technical burdens on the NRAs, which must
participate in the process of market definition, evaluate the level of competition in
markets and choose the necessary remedies. The NRAs are also operating in areas
where European jurisprudence is not yet clear: this applies particularly to cases where
several firms jointly exercise significant market power, or where market power is
exercised in a vertically related market.
These circumstances create a considerable degree of uncertainty for firms, which may
imperil investment and innovation. The uncertainty is aggravated by the low level of
attention hitherto paid to the specification of regulatory intervention which the NRAs
might choose. Several of these involve the mandating access to networks, sometimes at
low (cost-oriented) prices. The expectation that NRAs might apply this remedy widely
will discourage investment.
In order to make the regime predicable and consistent within the EU, it is vital that the
Commission plays a strong coordinating role.
2.  The coordination of regulatory intervention at the EC level
While the benefits of decentralised decision-making (through NRAs and other national
authorities) must be preserved as much as possible, the Working Party is convinced of
the need for a ‘hard’ coordination mechanism at EC level. The version of Article 6 of
the Framework Directive contained in the common position of the Council is therefore
inadequate and loses sight of the need to achieve the internal market in the
communications sector.
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At the same time, Article 6 of the Framework Directive – in the version put forward by
the Commission and the European Parliament – could be improved to alleviate the
concerns voiced by member states. Taking as a starting point the simplified version put
forward by the EP at its first reading:
•  When it submits draft measures to the Commission (Article 6(2)), the NRA should
indicate in its reasoning how it has taken into account the relevant decisions and
other pronouncements of the Commission and other NRAs, with a justification for
departing therefrom, as the case may be. The NRA should also consult the national
competition authority (NCA) before circulating a draft measure. This ‘upstream’
self-control should reduce the risk that the Commission would have to intervene
against a draft measure.
•  Before taking a ‘second-stage’ decision under Article 6(4) or 6(5), the Commission
should consult a committee made up of representatives from the NRAs. This should
ensure that the Commission remains in touch with the concrete problems faced by
NRAs.
The resulting procedure would remain quick (maximum three months) and would likely
grow to resemble the merger control procedure, where the second stage is used
relatively infrequently.
Moreover, the scope of Article 6 of the Framework Directive should also include
measures relating to radio spectrum (Article 8(3), (4) and (5) of the Framework
Directive). The UMTS (universal mobile telecommunications system) experience
provides ample justification for this. On this point as well, the common position is
inadequate.
Finally, it is unfortunate that the Framework Directive contains no provision to ensure
the consistency of national court decisions, such as those found in the proposed
regulation reforming the competition law procedures under Articles 81 and 82 EC.
3.  The internal market
The Working Party is dismayed at the apparent lack of concern for internal market
objectives on the part of the Community institutions. The internal market for electronic
communications is by no means achieved, and the proposed new framework does not
make it much more likely that it will be achieved soon.
In particular, the proposed Authorisation Directive, while clearly an improvement on its
predecessor, leaves scope for further fragmentation, if for instance the various general
authorisations do not cover the same services from one member state to the other. If it is
not possible to have a general authorisation for all electronic communications, then at
least member states should strive to harmonise the scope of the various authorisations
they will put in place.
Furthermore, the new regulatory framework still misses the broader perspective. It does
not solve the problems linked to overlap with closely related regulatory schemes
following different principles, such as the Television Without Frontiers Directive and
the E-commerce Directive, both of which follow the home-state control principle, in
contrast to the regulation of electronic communications.CAVE & LAROUCHE
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The distinction between ‘electronic communications’ and content is made much too
strongly, in view of the obvious links between the two (as seen in recent competition
law decisions such as AOL/TimeWarner or Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram). For example, the
provisions on ‘must-carry’ in the Universal Service Directive remain overly technology-
dependent for the sake of avoiding ‘content regulation’.
The Community institutions should not hide behind such conceptual distinctions to
avoid presenting a coherent regulatory scheme that would advance the internal market
in electronic communications.1
C HAPTER 1
I NTRODUCTION
n the last quarter of 2001, the debate about the re-regulation of European
communications is reaching a final and critical stage. The Commission kicked off
the Communications Review in November 1999, with the publication of a document
that outlined the objectives and fundamental principles, and showed how they might be
realised through legislation. In July 2000, it released a set of proposals – five Directives
(Framework Directive, Access Directive, Authorisation Directive, Universal Service
Directive and Privacy Directive) and a Decision on Radio Spectrum – all subject to the
co-decision procedure (Article 251 EC).
1 In the course of the first half of 2001, these
proposals (apart from one) went though the first reading in the European Parliament and
were discussed in Council. In July and September 2001, the Commission tabled
amended proposals. The Council has now also made its common position known. The
Annex to this report contains all the references to the various documents made public so
far in the course of the legislative process.
The Commission’s policy objectives, set out at the beginning of the 1999 Review
process, are a satisfactory starting point. These are:
1.  to promote and sustain an open, competitive European market for
communications services, to provide an even better deal for the consumer in terms
of price, quality and value for money;
2.  to benefit the European citizen, by ensuring that all have affordable access to
universal service specified at the European level, and access to information
society services; protecting consumers in their dealings with suppliers; ensuring a
high level of data protection and privacy; improving transparency tariffs and
conditions for use in communications services; and addressing the special needs
of specific social groups, in particular disabled users and the elderly; and
3.  to consolidate the internal market in a converging environment, by removing
obstacles to the provision of communications networks and services at the
European level so that, in similar circumstances, similar operators are treated in
similar ways wherever the operator in the EU.
In the light of these objectives and the principles for regulatory action set out by the
1999 Review, we regard the appropriate criteria for assessment to be the following:
§  Is the regime transparent and as legally certain as possible?
§  Is it effective in protecting consumers?
§  Does it encourage investment, innovation and competition?
§  Does it promote the internal market?
                                                                
1  The Commission also presented a draft directive  on competition in the markets for electronic
communications services [2001] OJ C 96/2, to be adopted under Article 86(3) EC by the Commission
acting alone. This directive would consolidate and replace (with few modifications) Directive 90/388
[1990] OJ L 192/10, as it has been amended over the years.
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Inevitably, after such a long period of debate, many issues are already resolved. For
example, there is almost universal agreement that the new legislation should recognise
the phenomenon of convergence, and cover in an integrated way the networks and
services that were previously treated separately under the ‘telecommunications’ and
‘broadcasting’ headings. For this reason, the proposed directives cover not
telecommunications, but rather ‘electronic communications’.
There is also general recognition that the new arrangements should acknowledge the
progress that has been made in liberalising communications markets in recent years, and
the urgent need to free firms from regulatory intervention that market developments
have made either unnecessary or counter-productive.
There are, however, important issues yet to be resolved before the legislative process is
complete. These are issues that the European Parliament and the Council must now
address in their respective second readings; they may be resolved by informal
agreement among the Community institutions, but they may require a more formal
conciliation process carrying on into 2002.
The Working Party has focused its attention upon three issues in particular. The first
concerns the workability of the proposals in the directives under which national
regulatory agencies will analyse the degree of competition in European communications
markets and intervene by various means in cases where the market is found not to
exhibit effective competition. This task requires a great deal of demanding analytical
work to be undertaken by the NRAs, and there is clearly a risk that some may find this
impossible.
Related to this is the question of how responsibilities should be shared between the
European Commission on the one hand and the NRAs on the other. This bears on the
conflict between the desire to ensure that regulation is done at the lowest practicable
level, by bodies that have the best local knowledge, and the desire to ensure that a
harmonised approach is taken within the European Union. Related to this is the third
issue that we deal with, namely whether the proposed legislation adequately promotes
the internal market objective.
The report is thus organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines the triggers for regulatory
intervention in communications markets, and the form which that intervention can take.
Chapter 3 reviews issues arising in the coordination of regulatory intervention at
national and EU levels. Chapter 4 considers internal market issues.3
C HAPTER 2
T HE SMP FRAMEWORK AND THE S CALE OF I NTERVENTION
he new regulatory arrangements are set out in the proposed directives and draft
guidelines, which already extend over hundreds of pages of text. Although the
essence of the proposals can be fairly simply expressed, everyone agrees that the
devil is in the detail. In this chapter of the report, we focus on one key issue – whether
the regime that will emerge generates under-regulation which will lead to the
exploitation of consumers, or over-regulation which will stifle investment and
innovation, and ultimately work to the detriment of European citizens. Here we focus
upon the regulatory processes to be deployed under the regime. In the next chapter, we
turn our attention to the distribution of responsibilities for their use, particularly the
roles of the Commission and the NRAs.
The Working Party’s focus is not on the protection of individual consumers, or groups
of consumers, such as the disabled and elderly (important as they are), but upon the
problem of choosing levels of regulatory intervention that strike a balance between the
interests of consumers as a group and producers as a group, both in the short term and in
the long term, while furthering the internal market objective. In describing the current
arrangements we rely chiefly on the amended proposals tabled by the Commission in
July 2001, with appropriate references to alternative positions taken by the Parliament
and the Council.
2.1  Lessons of the 1998 package
It is useful briefly to assess the 1998 legislative package, which aimed at liberalising
telecommunications in the European Union.
2 For the ten years or more before that, a
series of green papers, directives, recommendations and other interventions had
imposed obligations on member states with respect to equipment markets, regulatory
structures, value-added services and the regulation of infrastructure and service
competition where it existed. But in 1998, the obligation was imposed on governments
to liberalise entry into their telecommunications markets (except for those few countries
for which extensions were granted).
However adequate the 1998 framework was at a conceptual level, serious defects
nevertheless appeared in its implementation. Liberalisation and harmonisation directives
first have to be transposed into national legislation to take effect in the member states.
The transposition process took nearly two years, but the Commission was able to report
in October 1999 that it was largely complete. But, as noted above, the directives give
member states considerable latitude in implementation. For example, the Licensing
Directive (Directive 97/13) permits ample variation on the requirements imposed on
new entrants, and despite a requirement in the Interconnection Directive (Directive
97/33) that interconnection charges be cost-based, interconnection charges within the
EU vary greatly.
Achieving the goals of liberalising the industry against the (initial) wishes of most
incumbent operators and of many member states has required substantial regulatory
intervention from the Commission. Moreover, the regulatory framework had to be
                                                                
2 This section draws on M. Cave and L. Prosperetti,  ‘European telecommunications infrastructure,’
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, No. 4, 2001.
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flexible enough to cover member states proceeding at quite different rates. In the early
stages of liberalisation – the transition to competition – it is necessary to constrain the
former monopolists considerably. Gradually this restraint can give way to a state of
normalisation, as competition is established and regulatory intervention diminishes.
In markets where there are no technical restrictions on entry, arising, for example, from
spectrum scarcity, the key structural requirement is that licenses should be granted to
operators subject to a minimum of conditions.
For behavioural regulation, three instruments are required in the early stages of
liberalisation:
§  Control of retail prices. This is necessary only when the historical operator
exercises market power at the retail level and where in the absence of retail price
controls, customers will be significantly disadvantaged. Member states have
historically fulfilled this consumer protection function, though under monopoly
conditions, in a way that had the result that the controlled tariffs were seriously
unbalanced with respect to cost.
§  Universal service obligation (USO). Governments have typically imposed a
universal service obligation requiring the historical telecommunications operator to
provide service to all parts of the country at a uniform price, despite the presence of
significant cost differences. Firms entering the market without such an obligation
have a strong incentive to focus on low-cost, ‘profitable’ customers, putting the
USO operator at a disadvantage: or the incumbent uses this as an argument against
entry. There are, however, other ways to fulfil a USO, such as tendering for its
provision.
§  Control of access prices. In order to keep all subscribers connected with each other
in the presence of competing network, operators require access to one another’s
networks to complete their customers’ calls. This requires a system of inter-operator
wholesale or network access prices. Especially in the early stages of competition,
entrants will require significant access to the dominant incumbent’s network, and
this relationship will almost inevitably necessitate regulatory intervention. As
infrastructure is duplicated (initially the infrastructure necessary for long-distance
and international conveyance), however, the need for direct price regulation of
certain network facilities diminishes. Interconnection has been central to the
development of competition within the EU, and the Commission has been heavily
involved.
The Interconnection Directive (Directive 97/33) requires that charges for
interconnection follow the principles of transparency and cost orientation. The first
principle implies the publication of a reference interconnection offer. As a corollary,
operators with significant market power (SMP) – defined as a 25% market share of a
large pre-specified national market – are required to keep separate accounts for their
wholesale or network activity and for other activities, including retailing. Cost
orientation turned out to be an excessively vague phrase, permitting excessive
interconnection charges.
Until adequate cost data were available, the Commission published recommended ‘best
current practice’ interconnection charges, based upon the average of the member states
with the lowest charges. Charges dropped rather fast for some countries, but not for all.THE SMP FRAMEWORK AND THE SCALE OF INTERVENTION
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The level of access charges is likely to have had a major impact on entry strategy. A
recent study commissioned by OPTA, the Dutch regulator, on the relationship between
access pricing in The Netherlands and the development of infrastructure competition
concluded that entrants in Holland typically adopted the policy of first replicating those
assets which involved a relatively small amount of sunk costs.
3 Thus a de novo entrant
may typically begin purely as a re-seller, investing primarily in marketing and
advertising. It may then switch to making investments in switching and conveyance at
the national level, before contemplating investment in the local loop.
A cable operator entering into telephony or the provision of internet services has a
different inheritance and may adopt a different strategy. Further investment is required
in the local loop, and the cable operator has to buy call termination from the incumbents
– a service that is wholly non-replicable. The cable operator also needs access to long-
distance conveyance, which it can either replicate itself or, for example, utilise facilities
built by a former re-seller now investing in the national infrastructure. Finally,
hypothetical non-cable entrants into the high band-width market will encounter the local
loop as a non-replicable asset, making unbundling of the loop indispensable.
This analysis identifies two ways in which regulatory influence can be brought to bear
to affect investment by infrastructure competitors. The first relates to the relative access
prices of different assets. An entrant’s investment decisions are more concerned with
the price of replicable assets than of non-replicable assets. A regulatory policy that
imposes a low price (relative to cost) for the former thus encourages infrastructure
investment. Secondly, because entrants take time to develop their competing asset base,
and begin with those assets that are the easiest to replicate, a policy of prices that rise
over time will facilitate the gradual development by entrants of their own
comprehensive network. The most investment-friendly policy is one of initially low
access prices for all network services, followed by a rising price trend applied
successfully to assets in descending order of replicability. Although the discussion
above has been couched in favour of the price at which mandatory access is available, it
can be translated into the alternative dimension of where access is mandated.
Taken together, the data and our account of falling access prices would seem to suggest
the de facto existence of a ‘service bias’ in European telecommunications regulation.
The Commission has wanted to open up all avenues of competition but in practice has
been more preoccupied with opening existing infrastructures than with encouraging the
construction of new ones. Entry of re-sellers has been vigorous and prices have been
dropping fast, but this does not seem to have provided medium-term incentives for an
extensive deployment of alternative infrastructures.
In a way, this is unsurprising, if we consider that existing ONP (open network
provision) legislation was drafted in the first half of the 1990s, when – outside the UK –
all major incumbents were state-owned. The idea of having competition upon a big,
publicly owned network was then quite attractive.
While competition between fixed networks in Europe is rather limited, as is competition
in fixed services markets in many member states, mobile has been a success story.
Government spectrum policy initially restricted entry, but as third and fourth operators
                                                                
3 M. Cave et al., ‘Access pricing and infrastructure investment (see http://users.wbs.warwick.ac.uk/cmur).CAVE & LAROUCHE
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came into the market, prices fell and demand grew, assisted by innovative tariffs such as
handset subsidies and pre-pay. The adoption within Europe of a highly successful
second-generation standard, GSM, assisted in this process. The sector was lightly
regulated. Apart from two pinch points, mobile call termination and international
roaming charges, the absence of regulation was highly beneficial.
The new regulatory regime is thus being developed against a background of significant
successes in mobile but much more limited competition in fixed services.
2.2 The new regime
At one level, the new regime is a major step down the transition path between
monopoly and normal competition, governed exclusively by generic competition law,
with regulatory ‘sunset clauses’ built in by the prohibition on regulating ‘effectively
competitive’ markets. It represents an ingenious attempt to flexibly corral the NRAs to
go down the path of normalisation – allowing them, however, to proceed at their own
speed (but within the uniform framework necessary for the internal market). Since the
end state is one governed by competition law, the Commission proposes to move away
from the rather arbitrary and piecemeal approach of the current regulatory package
towards something consistent with competition law. However, competition law is to be
applied not in a responsive ex post fashion, but in a pre-emptive ex ante form. The new
regime therefore relies on a special implementation of the standard competition triple of
market definition, identifying dominance, and formulating remedies. We examine these
in turn.
4
a)  Market definition
Under the Framework Directive, the Commission will issue a decision on relevant
markets – intended to be defined in the manner of competition policy; NRAs may
depart from the decision with respect to geographical market definition if they think it
appropriate to do so in their own circumstances (see Section 3 below). The NRAs and,
more significantly, the Council (which in some respects appears to have been captured
by the NRAs) prefer the list of markets to be a recommendation, departure from which
is easier.
Both NRAs and NCAs and the Commission and European Court of Justice have
undertaken many market definition exercises already, often using the now conventional
competition policy approach. It is generally agreed that this involves applying the so-
called hypothetical monopolist test, under which the analysts seek to identify the
smallest set of goods or services with the characteristic that, if a monopolist gained
control over them, it would be able to raise prices by 5 to 10 percent over a sustained
period, normally taken to be about a year. The monopolist’s ability to force through a
price increase obviously depends upon the extent to which consumers can switch away
from the good or service in question (demand substitution) and the extent to which
firms can quickly adapt their existing productive capacity to enhance supply (supply
substitution).
                                                                
4 The first two of these processes are set out more fully in a draft Guideline, which is currently being
revised. The first draft, however, confined itself largely to general, rather than specific advice. The
absence of a guideline on remedies is discussed below.THE SMP FRAMEWORK AND THE SCALE OF INTERVENTION
7 7
While this approach is conceptually helpful, it is difficult to apply in practice,
particularly across 15 markets simultaneously. It is reasonable to suppose that the
Commission will be forced to fall back on more informal approaches which inevitably
give the market definer considerable latitude.
It is often observed that market definitions depend upon the nature of the investigation
that is being undertaken. This proposition is reinforced by examining the list of market
definitions in the communications industry, adopted by the European Court of Justice
and the Commission, which suggests that, in certain cases involving mergers or specific
anti-competitive practices, highly disaggregated market definitions have been adopted.
It is pertinent to point out that, since competition authorities will have access to specific
ex post remedies under national and European competition law, there is no need to seek
to replicate in the decision very narrow market definitions adopted for the purposes of
particular inquiries.
In terms of their effect on the intrusiveness and effectiveness of regulation, market
definitions cut both ways. A narrow definition increases the prospect of finding
significant market power (SMP) but confines the scope of regulation. A broad definition
is likely to reduce any firm’s market share, but a finding of SMP will give regulators the
obligation to intervene over a wide area.
A consequence of the reliance of the proposed new regime on pre-emptive regulation is
that it is appropriate to adopt a forward perspective. Under the proposals, a finding of
dominance (or significant market power) entails some kind of regulatory intervention:
as in the case under the Merger Control Regulation, there is no need to make a finding
of abuse. In the Working Party’s view, market definitions should take account of
foreseeable changes in market conditions.
b)  Dominance
After first proposing an even more interventionist proposal, the Commission retained, in
its initial set of proposals of July 2000, as a threshold for intervention the classical
‘dominance’ threshold, which it calls significant market power.
5 Article 13 of the
proposed Framework Directive states that the dominance can be exercised by a single
firm, or collectively, or leveraged into a vertically related market.
In addition, Article 14 of the Framework Directive contained a prohibition on
intervention in markets that are effectively competitive – implicitly defining markets
where dominance is absent as effectively competitive. This is a change of fundamental
importance, and a major step in the route towards convergence with competition law. Its
significance depends, however, upon the scope of dominance. Although single firm
dominance has come to be well understood, joint dominance remains one of the most
elusive and unstable components of European competition law.
Traditionally, joint dominance was considered to require the existence of some kind of
formal ‘economic link’ between the firms in question – for example some degree of
                                                                
5 The same term was used in the 1997 Interconnection Directive, but with a different meaning (see
Section 2.1 above).CAVE & LAROUCHE
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common ownership.
6 Recent judgements have expanded the interpretation of economic
links to include the relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a
tight oligopoly where the firms are in a position to anticipate one another’s behaviour
and are therefore inclined to behave in parallel.
In practice, in order to demonstrate collective dominance, it may be necessary to show
that firms are tacitly coordinating their conduct on the basis of explicit expectations of
rivals’ responses. On this interpretation, it would not be enough, for example, to show
(à la Cournot) that each firm was operating in a way that accepted its rivals’ current
behaviour as a ‘given’ in competitive conditions. In relation to an observed highly
concentrated market, rather than in a merger proceeding where the focus is inevitably on
the hypothetical consequences of the merger, the prospects for proof of joint dominance
are weak.
The communications industry, like many industries, consists of a series of activities that
can be performed either individually by vertically separated firms or jointly by a
vertically integrated firm. There are well established benign motives for firms to
become vertically integrated. In particular, doing so may reduce production costs, by
eliminating the costs of transactions between two separate firms. It has also been argued
that vertical integration by itself does not add additional market power. Thus, if a firm
held a monopoly of an activity or process at any stage in an industry it would be able to
extract maximum profit from that monopoly, and would have no desire to engage in
other activities, unless it was extremely efficient in performing them.
More recent analysis of vertical integration has focused upon the way in which a firm
can enhance its position by bringing together degrees of market power at different levels
in the production process, in such a way that the whole becomes greater than the sum of
the parts.
This is achieved by a variety of means involving the interaction of particular features of
each market. For example, in one market (say, for delivery platforms), there may be
consumer switching costs, because consumers need to make significant investments in
equipment. The second may exhibit differentiation (for example, a live broadcast from
one soccer league may be a poor substitute for a broadcast from another). In such
circumstances, making the service exclusive to the delivery platform may strengthen
consumer lock-in and give the firm an ability to distort competition. In many cases in
the communications industry, however, particular activities (including the operation of
networks and of technical services) are likely to be undertaken by small numbers of
operators that are themselves vertically integrated into services. Significant detriment
may arise for consumers in circumstances where a finding of single dominance would
be difficult.
In these cases, the issues of joint dominance and leveraging interact, creating
considerable uncertainty about the regulatory outcome. More generally, it is difficult for
firms to forecast how widely NRAs or the bodies to which their decisions can be
appealed will define dominance.
                                                                
6 Certain types of agreement between firms might also be caught under Article 81, which prohibits
collusion among firms.THE SMP FRAMEWORK AND THE SCALE OF INTERVENTION
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c)  Remedies
Under the proposed directives, NRAs will have the power to impose obligations on
firms found to enjoy significant market power in a relevant market. In earlier drafts, the
NRA had the obligation to act as well, but this would have been inappropriate where the
NRA’s market analysis finds no signs of abuse.
The NRAs will act within a framework of duties set out in Article 7 of the proposed
Framework Directive.
7 This observes that the measures they take shall be proportionate
to the policy objectives identified. This can be construed as meaning that the
intervention is appropriate, no more than is necessary, and, by implication, satisfies a
cost-benefit test, in the sense that the expected benefits from the intervention exceed the
expected costs. Article 7 additionally specifies policy objectives, which determine the
weights appropriate for use in the cost-benefit analysis. For example, Article 7(2)
requires NRAs to promote an open and competitive market for electronic
communications networks and services by maximising users’ choice and value for
money, eliminating distortions or restrictions to competition and encouraging efficient
investment and infrastructure. Article 7(4) requires NRAs to promote the interest of
European citizens by, inter alia, providing consumers with protection in their dealings
with suppliers and requiring transparency of tariffs and conditions of using publicly
available electronic communications services. NRAs must also contribute to the
development of the internal market by avoiding different approaches to regulation
within the EU. These provisions provide an important context in which NRAs must
hone their interventions.
In the light of the application of the concept of dominance in the proposed directive (in
particular in Article 13 of the Framework Directive), the NRAs must also ensure that
they act in accordance with European case law. One way of interpreting this
requirement is that the NRAs should intervene in relation to an operator with SMP to
produce behaviour consistent with that which would exonerate a dominant firm from
the charge of abuse before the European Court of Justice. Regulatory interventions
should also take account of other aspects of the framework to be established by the
proposed directives. Notably, the existence of a procedure for resolving disputes
between undertakings (set out in Article 17 of the proposed Framework Directive)
provides an additional mechanism for resolving disputes. The existence of this
alternative approach should be taken into account in determining whatever interventions
are required.
Little attention has been paid to the question of the action to be taken by an NRA in
relation to a firm or firms judged to exercise SMP. While the circumstances in which
intervention is required are set out in the proposed Framework Directive, discussion of
the nature of the regulatory response is principally confined to the proposed Access
Directive.
8 Putting on one side proposals relating to conditional access systems and
other associated facilities, Articles 8 to 13 of the proposed Access Directive outline the
NRA’s options. Thus Article 8 (Imposition, Amendment or Withdrawal of Obligations)
reads as follows:
                                                                
7 References are to the amended proposals (COM (2001) 369 and 380), 4 July 2001.
8 Article 16 of the Universal Service Directive also considers retail price control.CAVE & LAROUCHE
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1: Where an operator is deemed to have significant market power on a
specific market ..., national regulatory authorities shall impose one or more
of the obligations set out in Articles 9-13 of this Directive as appropriate, in
order to avoid distortions of competition. The specific obligation(s) imposed
shall be based on the nature of the problem identified.
2a: Obligations imposed in accordance with this article shall be based on the
nature of the problem identified, and shall be proportionate and justified in
the light of the objectives laid down in Article 7 of the [Framework
Directive]...
However, while Articles 9-13 of the Access Directive and the associated recitals (Nos.
9-14) contain some indications of the circumstances in which, in the Commission’s
view, a particular obligation should be imposed, the mapping from the existence of
SMP to the appropriate regulatory solution is, at the least, incomplete. This opens the
door to the possibility of over-regulation, under-regulation or regulation which, because
the intervention does not deal with the problem in question, is simultaneously
unnecessary and ineffective.
The ascending hierarchy of obligations in Articles 9-13 of the Access Directive can be
summarised and evaluated as follows:
Article 9 of the Access Directive: Obligation of transparency. This involves publishing
data on technical specifications, network characteristics, terms and conditions for
supplying use, and prices. In particular, NRAs may require the publication of a
reference offer.
This contains a range of different disclosures. Some of them can be construed as
necessary for other firms to achieve interconnection or network access, for
example the location and current technical specifications of points of
interconnection. In the case of a firm with SMP, these may be fairly
unexceptional, although the standardisation process may have already placed
much of the information in the public domain. Others relate to transparent
commercial conditions for supply, including price. Without the obligation of non-
discrimination (see Article 10), there is no obvious basis for requiring the
publication of a reference offer.
Disclosure of price data, is a possible instrument of collusion or price leadership.
For this reason, price disclosure may be particularly unsuitable as a remedy where
joint dominance is in question. The same problem applies in a moderated form to
single dominance. Under the cost benefit test, the risk of harm should be high to
justify price disclosure.
The implication of this analysis is that NRAs should address the question of
transparency in a nuanced way. While the case for disclosure of technical
information for a firm’s access to technical facilities may be strong, the same
reasoning does not extend to the mandatory disclosure of pricing information,
which is rarely desirable of and by itself, even though it may be an element of
more vigorous obligations.THE SMP FRAMEWORK AND THE SCALE OF INTERVENTION
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 Article 10 of the Access Directive: Obligation of non-discrimination. This requires
the operator to provide similar conditions in similar circumstances to other
undertakings providing similar services, and to provide services and information to
others under the same conditions and of the same quality as they provide for their own
services, or those of their subsidiaries or partners.
Since obligations relating to mandatory and cost-oriented access appear later in
the Access Directive (see Articles 12 and 13 discussed below), it seems
reasonable to conclude that Article 10 does not of itself trigger these obligations.
 This is primarily relevant to cases of an SMP operator which is vertically
integrated into a competitive market, and the obligation is said to be needed to
prevent exclusionary behaviour by the firm with SMP, through the foreclosure of
competition in the upstream and downstream market. The key issue, therefore, is
whether this is a matter that can adequately be dealt with under competition law,
on the basis that such behaviour would be a clear and foreseeable breach of
Article 82 EC, for which significant case law exists.
In the absence of such integration, a firm may choose to price discriminate, or
discriminate in other ways, in response to different demand conditions. This
would immediately raise the question of whether such conduct would be
justifiable in efficiency terms, in accordance with the inverse elasticity rule. If the
ultimate problem were one of excessive pricing, then the obligation of non-
discrimination might be ineffective, and counterproductive for consumer welfare.
9
Article 11 of the Access Directive: Obligation of accounting separation. An NRA may
require a vertically integrated company to make its wholesale prices and its internal
transfer prices transparent, especially where the companies which it supplies and itself
compete in the same downstream market.
This represents a considerable ratcheting up of the regulatory burden on the firm
with SMP. NRAs should ask themselves whether the additional burden is
justified. The principal justification would be a situation in which there were a
persistent network monopoly enjoying an entrenched competitive advantage
(which may itself be the result of regulatory policies on retail tariffs – see below),
which merits ring fencing.
It has been argued that separate accounts may also play a role in facilitating the
subsequent detection of particular abuses using competition law instruments. An
NRA would, however, have to give serious thought to the question of whether this
provides a legitimate justification for imposing such a wide-ranging obligation
rather than the obligation to be able to demonstrate non-discrimination, or to
respond to charges of abuse of dominance.
Article 12 of the Access Directive:  Obligations of access to, and use of specific
network facilities. An NRA may impose obligations on operators to grant access to
                                                                
9 This involves the well known proposition that third degree price discrimination (charging different
buyers different amounts for the same product) can increase both profits and consumer welfare, in
comparison with a situation in which discrimination is prohibited.CAVE & LAROUCHE
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specific facilities or services, including in situations when the denial of access would
hinder the emergence of a competitive retail market, or would not be in the end users’
interests.
This represents an obligation to be implemented in circumstances similar to, but
significantly broader than, those in which the essential facilities doctrine is
applied under competition law.
10 The extension of the test lies in the replacement
of the precondition under competition law for mandatory access, that the asset is
essential and cannot be replicated by any reasonable income, by a much broader
condition that NRAs can mandate access in circumstances where its denial ‘would
hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or
would not be in the end-user’s interest.’
There is a risk that the last phrase in particular (‘would not be in the end-user’s
interest’) might open the door for extensive regulatory intervention. The obvious
problem is the conflict between users’ short-run and long-run interests. Short-run
interests might best be furthered by the adoption of mandatory access on a wide
scale. However, such a policy clearly reduces incentives to invest in competing
facilities, and is likely to stifle innovation in the long term.
On the basis of this argument, and given the general desire that a new regulatory
framework should approximate closely to competition law, there are grounds for
changing the drafting of the Obligation. Should this not be done, then NRAs
should rigorously apply an appropriate cost benefit test, using a suitable discount
rate to weigh up short-term gains to end-users against the medium and long term
disadvantages which a policy of mandatory access might bring.
Article 13 of the Access Directive: Price control and cost accounting obligations. This
deals with situations where a potential lack of competition means that the operator
concerned might be capable of sustaining prices at an excessive level, or applying a
price squeeze, to the detriment of end users. National regulators should take into
account the investment made by the operator and the risks involved.
It is generally accepted that the finding that a facility is essential implies the
application of some appropriate pricing rule. The nature of that pricing rule is,
however, by no means clear. In this context, Article 13 can be conceived as
imposing the obligation of cost-oriented prices, the operator assuming the burden
of proving that ‘the charges are derived from costs including a reasonable rate of
return on investment...’
The circumstances identified as appropriate for the application of this rule are
‘situations where a market analysis indicates that a potential lack of effective
competition means that the operator concerned might be capable of sustaining
prices at an excessively high level, or applying a price squeeze to the detriment of
end users’. There is, however, a major distinction between these two cases. In the
case of excessive pricing, the question is whether SMP is being exploited directly
                                                                
10 Article 11 of the Framework Directive notes the application of the disputes resolution procedure
(Article 17) to failures to agree on co-location and facility sharing. This represents a more restricted form
of intervention which may be preferable in certain cases.THE SMP FRAMEWORK AND THE SCALE OF INTERVENTION
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through an excessive price. In the case of a margin squeeze, the hypothesis is that
the operator with SMP is foreclosing competition in a vertically related area by
pricing that fails to cover costs. The appropriate way of dealing with the latter
issue is discussed above.
Cost-oriented pricing for interconnection or access to customers should only be
considered when dealing with an operator with SMP which is both persistent and
incapable of being dealt with by other remedies, including particularly structural
remedies. A classic case for its application might therefore be access to the local
loop, either for call termination or for the purposes of leasing unbundled loops –
provided that one operator enjoys a monopoly or position of super-dominance in
the relevant geographical area.
It is far more questionable whether the principle should be applied where there is
network duplication. This question has arisen particularly in connection with the
mobile market, in relation both to indirect access or access to the network by
virtual network operators.
In the former connection it has correctly been argued by OFTEL (and other
NRAs) that offering cost-plus access to mobile call origination to indirect access
providers would have the consequence of imposing a particular configuration of
mobile call charges, prohibiting tariff innovation, such as the use of handset
subsidies to expand the market, and reducing incentives to invest in competing
networks. On the other hand, OFTEL has argued that the obligation to provide
indirect access on a retail minus basis may be appropriate in the interests of
expanding the number of competitive suppliers in a sector where spectrum
limitations place a constraint upon the number of network operators.
In other words, NRAs should be extremely parsimonious in imposing the
obligation of cost-oriented prices. It should be confined to cases where the
monopoly is persistent and incapable of being addressed by structural remedies.
The option of retail minus pricing should be retained.
These provisions relate to the terms on which one operator obtains access to
another’s network or customers. It is arguable that, if appropriate regulatory
arrangements are in place in this respect, then the need for additional retail price
regulation is limited, on the basis that firms would be able to buy interconnection
and access services and perform their own retailing functions, where entry into
retailing is freer – absent retail margin squeezes which the interventions above are
designed to prohibit. However, the draft Directive on Users’ Rights offers an
additional regulatory intervention relating to retail tariffs (see below).
Article 16 of the Universal Service Directive: Retail Price Regulation. Where an NRA
determines that a retail market is not effectively competitive, it shall ensure that
undertakings with significant market power in that market orient their tariffs towards
costs, avoiding excessive pricing, predatory pricing, undue preference to specific users
or unreasonable bundling of services. This may be done by appropriate retail price cap
measures. Where there is retail tariff regulation, appropriate cost-accounting systems
must be implemented. Retail tariff control may not be applied in geographical or user
markets where the NRA is satisfied that there is effective competition. It has beenCAVE & LAROUCHE
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suggested that retail price regulation will apply only to retail services subject to a USO.
This requirement is not explicit in the current proposals, and should be made so.
The implicit assumption of many regulators and commentators of the
communications industry is that if wholesale markets can be regulated to avoid
the harmful effects of SMP, then regulation of retail markets can be confined to
solving residual consumer protection problems, rather than problems relating to
the abuse of market power. The underlying hypothesis is that entry into retailing
activities will be sufficiently free from barriers to permit deregulation.
This proposition has not been properly tested, as many NRAs have been reluctant
to accept the fundamental implication of the policy, which is that cost-based
wholesale prices and competition in the retail market will bring retail prices into
line with costs, thereby eliminating distributionally important pricing distortions
associated with regulator-driven cross subsidies (or departure from cost
orientation), involving either  different services, such as fixed line access and
usage, or different groups of customers, such as high-cost rural and low-cost
urban consumers.
The working out of this dilemma can be seen in OFTEL’s recent decision and
consultation documents relating to regulation of the retail prices of fixed line
services. The ‘problem’ is that BT continues to make persistent excess profits on
its retail activities, both to residential and business customers. One possible
response is to move away from unbalanced tariffs in the retail market. The effects
of this could, of course, be mitigated by targeted regulation intervention to protect
particular groups of users.
The above discussion has suggested indications and contra-indications for the
application of the various interventions considered. We present them below in tabular
form.
Obligation Indication Contra-indications or
adverse effects
Transparency Technical information
indispensable to successful
interconnection
Price disclosure may ensure
excessive/rigid prices
Non-discrimination Partial remedy against margin
squeeze
Too broad a prohibition may
reduce consumer welfare;
conditions for discrimination
may not exist
Separate accounting Potentially useful for persistent
monopoly
Costly; not essential for price
squeeze investigation
Mandatory access Useful to dealing with persistent
network monopoly
Reduces incentives to invest and
innovate
Cost-oriented pricing Useful to dealing with persistent
network monopoly
Reduces incentives to invest and
innovate
Retail price control Can maintain distorted retail
price structure; possible
approach to consumer
protection issues (e.g.
ignorance)
Widespread mandatory access
by re-sellers an alternativeTHE SMP FRAMEWORK AND THE SCALE OF INTERVENTION
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Perhaps the most striking feature of this analysis is that three of the five ‘access and
interconnection’ remedies are principally appropriate to cases of persistent monopoly,
of the kind found primarily in the fixed local loop. On this basis, the scale of desirable
regulatory intervention under the new arrangement is quite limited. This highlights the
fact that sector-specific regulation should be confined to cases where some durable
feature of the market creates a persistent and high barrier to entry. In some cases, the
barrier may be legal or regulatory – for example, limited allocation of spectrum may
represent an absolute barrier to entry in mobile markets, although the latter may still be
effectively competitive provided enough operators are licensed, even if entry is then
prohibited. In other cases, notably the local loop, the barrier may arise from the
combination of significant economies of scale and sunk investment, which together
ensure that the market is not contestable.
It is, of course, possible to multiply types of regulatory obligations – for example by
improving a specific restriction on bundling and typing. However, the Working Party
has taken the view that the pay-off to this is probably negative, simply because each
example is different and requires the kind of ‘rule of reason’ or case by case approach
which is best applied under competition law, rather than sector-specific regulation
2.3  Evaluation
It is now time provisionally to evaluate the proposals in terms of the criteria identified
above. The first issue was whether the regime is transparent and legally certain. The
analysis above notes the importance of the fact that NRAs can only intervene when
SMP is identified in the relevant market. Hence the importance of market definition, the
current proposals for which involve sharing of responsibilities between the Commission
and NRAs. This facet of the situation, and the inherently subjective element in market
definition, make it difficult for companies to anticipate whether they are likely to be
regarded as holding SMP. Some of this uncertainty will diminish once the process gets
underway, but it would be hard to overestimate the burden that the proposed framework
will place on NRAs (or their economic and legal consultants).
The second element, the determination of dominance, also is subject to uncertainty,
particularly in relation to joint dominance. This may shortly be clarified by the
European Court of Justice or by a notice from the Commission. At present, however, the
burden of proof on the NRA to demonstrate what economists refer to as tacitly
collusively behaviour seems high.
Finally, there is a question of remedies. When confronted with SMP, NRAs have to do
something, but the arsenal at their disposal ranges from popguns to nuclear weapons,
with most of them tending towards the latter than towards the former. The silence in the
Access Directive on any cost-related pricing scheme lyric is a worry, although its less-
draconian alternative, retail minus, may be implicit in the mandatory access obligation.
In summary, the proposed arrangements are sophisticated and share some of the high-
level conceptual certainties as are enjoyed by competition law. However, their
application in particular cases is highly unpredictable.CAVE & LAROUCHE
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It is helpful to brigade the next two criteria of protecting consumers and encouraging
investment, innovation and competition together, because, in our view, the success of
the regime in these two respects hinges crucially on the same consideration.
11 The
criteria require answers to the question whether the new regime is capable of striking an
appropriate balance between consumers’ short-term interests and in the promotion of
service competition and their long-run interests in facilities competition. In this respect,
the Working Party shares the view of Justice Stephen Breyer of the US Supreme Court,
who in a judgement on an interconnection issue, observed:
Increased sharing by itself does not automatically mean increased
competition. It is in the unshared, not in the shared portions of the
enterprise that meaningful competition would likely emerge. Rules that
force firms to share every resource or element of the business would
create, not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators, not the
market place, would set the relevant terms. (Quoted in A.E. Kahn, Whom
the Gods Would Destroy or How not to Deregulate, 2001, p. 7.)
Put simply, the Working Group’s concern is that NRAs may not take this view, and may
be excessively prone to mandate access, at cost-based prices. This would be contrary to
the policy objective of encouraging investment and innovation, but it would be justified
in terms of short-run consumer protection.
How can this outcome best be avoided? What is required is a coordinating mechanism
which prevents NRAs from over regulating. There are a number of ways in which this
might be achieved in principle, but under the current proposals, the key area is the
distribution of responsibility between NRAs and the Commission. To put it bluntly, the
de-regulatory intentions of a good regime could be undermined by excessive discretion
exercised by NRAs bent on over-intrusive regulation.
                                                                
11 The Single Market issue is discussed in Chapter 4.17
CHAPTER 3
THE COORDINATION OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION
IN THE UNION AND BEYOND
3.1 The case for institutional coordination
One of the most positive and welcome developments in the proposed new regulatory
framework for electronic communications is that more attention is paid to institutional
and procedural issues.
Indeed, as things currently stand, firms active in the sector have to deal with numerous
regulatory authorities. In a given member state, the following authorities will have a say
in communications matters:
§  the National Regulatory Authority (NRA), whose existence is mandated by the EC
regulatory framework;
12
§  the National Competition Authority (NCA), which can intervene in a large number
of disputes on the strength of national competition law, EC law (if empowered to
apply it) or both; and
§  the national courts, which can intervene not only as a further instance, by way of
appeal or judicial review of administrative decisions, but also directly on the
strength of Articles 81 and 82 EC or whatever powers they might derive from
national regulatory or competition law.
In addition, of course, the European Commission can step in, either directly in its
capacity as competition authority or more indirectly as the guardian of proper
application of EC law by the member states (including their authorities).
As soon as a firm operates at a more pan-European level, the above picture must of
course be multiplied by the number of member states involved (except for the European
Commission). Moreover, in a context of convergence, even if the proposed new
regulatory framework strives to establish a clear dividing line between content and
networks, it cannot be excluded that national authorities concerned with content would
also have their say, making the institutional side of the regulatory framework even more
of a maze.
In the light of the above, it would be tempting to issue a strong disapproval of the
current state of affairs. Yet upon a closer look there are some redeeming features that
must also be taken into account.
From a practical perspective, the proliferation of competent authorities can serve the
interests of claimants, by giving them a choice of fora in which to pursue their
grievances; in each case, they will presumably pick the one that they perceive as the
most favourable to their claim. Obviously, this may contribute to keeping the pressure
on prospective defendants to comply with applicable law and regulation. For
prospective defendants, however, it can become difficult to manage legal and regulatory
                                                                
12 Now in Directive 90/387 (ONP Framework Directive) [1990] OJ L 192/1, Art. 5a (as added by
Directive 97/51 [1997] OJ L 295/23) and Directive 90/388 (Services Directive) [1990] OJ L 192/10, Art.
In the new framework, the creation of NRAs is mandated in the Framework Directive, Art. 3.CAVE & LAROUCHE
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matters when claims can arise in a number of fora. Most significant firms are likely to
fall on the claimant side in some member states and on the defendant side in others, so
that they experience both advantages and disadvantages.
The risk of contradictory decisions from these various instances affects claimants and
defendants alike, however. Claimants who would have erred in their choice of forum
might see their competitors obtain better results in another forum. More significantly,
defendants might be put in a position where they have to comply with contradictory or
perhaps even incompatible rulings.
Without a doubt, the risk of contradiction is the main drawback of having multiple
authorities. In fact, uncoordinated action by the various authorities undermines the very
basis for regulatory intervention: because of excessive costs arising from contradictions
and incompatibilities, regulatory intervention could very well fail to deliver any overall
benefit.
In any event, within a single member state, contradiction should be avoided at all costs,
since the various authorities exert jurisdiction over the same firms within the same
territory, and operational difficulties arise immediately. However, most member states
have already provided for coordination mechanisms in their legislation, at least as
regards NRAs and NCAs, ahead of proposed EC law obligations in this respect.
13
The situation is less clear-cut at the EC level and beyond. As a starting point, it is trite
to say that the communications sector has a global dimension, and that communications
firms, as soon as they reach a certain size, plan and operate at a regional if not global
level. The logical consequence is that regulation should correspondingly be coordinated
– at the very least – at the level at which firms operate. For a pan-European or global
communications firm, contradictory or even incompatible decisions arising from the
respective authorities of various member states engender significant costs, since they
complicate the entire range of activity, all the way from business planning down to
operations. They also give rise to distortions of competition, when certain firms conduct
a large part of their operations under a more or a less favourable national legal and
regulatory framework. The situation is typical of failures in the internal market, and the
solution involves greater coordination at EC level and beyond.
At the same time, there are some reasons for refraining from coordinating the actions of
national authorities more than necessary:
§  Learning-by-doing. In the telecommunications sector, there is agreement on the
general regulatory principles (e.g. access on a non-discriminatory, transparent, cost-
oriented basis). However, more specific decisions are notoriously difficult to take,
given policy, technical and economic considerations (e.g. what type of access must
be given? which conditions are not discriminatory? what price level qualifies as
cost-oriented?). A number of options are open, none of which can be dismissed out
of hand or picked as the obvious winner. In such cases, authorities that have to take
decisions on the same or similar issues can benefit from the experience of those that
already had to commit themselves to a decision. With time, one or more best
practice(s) should emerge.
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§  Closeness to the playing field. National authorities are usually in a better position to
know the situation in their respective jurisdictions, if only because their resources
are devoted solely to that jurisdiction.
§  Responsiveness and flexibility. Furthermore, the various decision-making
procedures available under EC law are known to take some time: coordination at the
EC level is thus likely to lead to longer decision-making processes. As a result,
regulatory intervention will then be less responsive and flexible, since both its onset
and its termination will not follow as closely the development of the market.
In the end, no simple solution can be put forward to ensure the appropriate level of
coordination. Nonetheless, some guiding principles can be put forward:
§  The benefits of a more decentralised approach, as described above, will not arise
automatically from the mere fact that decisions are taken by national authorities. For
instance, there is little to be gained if a national authority takes a decision in
complete isolation, without examining what other authorities have done or are
contemplating doing. Similarly, taking a different decision for political reasons
(power struggle, etc.) unrelated to the situation of the market is counter-productive.
At the very least, it would follow that, national authorities should be obliged to take
into account the work of other authorities, and that they should give reasons if they
choose a different route.
§  The benefits of coordination can equally be lost through overly long or complicated
procedures. The coordination procedure must therefore aim to keep costs and delays
to a minimum.
The amount of coordination can vary depending on the level of the decision, which
ranges from general policy decisions to individual cases. At the level of general policy
decisions, i.e. legislation, a strong case can be made for coordination. At the opposite
end of the range, i.e. decisions in individual cases, the benefits of a decentralised
approach are overwhelming. One of the main characteristics of the regulation of
electronic communications
14 is that a number of significant decisions are taken at an
intermediate level, somewhere between legislation and individual decisions. For
instance, decisions concerning the main aspects of interconnection with the incumbent
(tariffs, conditions of co-location, etc.) are derived from higher legislative principles
(cost-orientation, non-discrimination); at the same time, they go beyond the individual
case, since they influence the operations of the whole industry. That intermediate level
definitely benefits from coordination, yet at that level coordination must be more
carefully balanced against the benefits of a more decentralised approach.
The current regulatory framework harmonises a number of basic principles, but it does
not go much ‘deeper’ in order to ensure coordination at the intermediate level, as
described above. This has been a weak point in EC telecommunications law so far.
Even where an effort was made to take EC-level coordination fairly far, as with the
unbundling of the local loop where an EC regulation was adopted on that specific topic,
the lack of coordination further down, when member states had to turn the regulation
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into concrete decisions, is proving to be very costly and threatens to nullify the benefits
to be expected from an EC-wide approach.
3.2 Article 6 of the proposed Framework Directive
Against that background, the Working Party very much welcomes the intention of the
Community institutions to improve upon the coordination amongst member states
through various mechanisms. The main one is Article 6 of the proposed Framework
Directive, in particular Article 6(2) and following.
Article 6 of the proposed Framework Directive has been one of the most debated
provisions of the whole new package so far, and the three institutions have put forward
different views, which are summed up in the following table, together with the proposed
solution put forward by the Working Party (discussed further below).
Commission –
Amended proposal
EP – 1
st reading Council – Common
position
CEPS Working Party
Proposal
Covers decisions
concerning frequencies
(Art. 8(3), 8(4), 8(5) FD),
relevant market definition
and analysis (Art. 14(4),
14(5) FD) and departures
from SMP framework
(Art. 8(2) AD)
Covers decisions
concerning frequencies
(Art. 8(3), 8(4), 8(5) FD),
relevant market definition
and analysis (Art. 14(4),
14(5) FD) and departures
from SMP framework
(Art. 8(2) AD)
Covers decisions
concerning relevant
market definition and
analysis (Art. 14(2),
14a(4), 14a(5), 14a(5a)
FD) and departures from
SMP framework (Art. 8(2)
AD)
Covers decisions concerning
frequencies (Art. 8(3), 8(4),
8(5) FD), relevant market
definition and analysis (Art.
14(4), 14(5) FD) and
departures from SMP
framework (Art. 8(2) AD)
NRA communicates draft
measure to Commission
and other NRAs
NRA communicates draft
measure to Commission
NRA communicates draft
measure to Commission
and other NRAs
After consultation with NCA,
NRA communicates draft
measure to Commission,
including an explanation of
how the position of other
NRAs and the Commission
was taken into account and a
justification for departure
therefrom
Other NRAs comment
within general comment
period
Commission and other
NRAs comment within 1
month (or general
comment period if longer)
NRA takes utmost account
of comments of other
NRAs and communicates
draft measure to
Commission
NRA takes utmost account
of comments of other
NRAs and Commission
and adopts measure, save
for cases listed below
Commission has one
month to respond,
otherwise NRA can adopt
measure
Commission has one
month to respond,
otherwise NRA can adopt
measure
Commission has one month
to respond, otherwise NRA
can adopt measure
If Commission has serious
doubts, adoption
suspended for 2 months
If Commission has
serious doubts, adoption
suspended for 2 months
If i) measure substantially
differs from the draft or ii)
Commission voiced
serious doubts, measure
suspended for 1 more
month
If Commission has serious
doubts, adoption suspended
for 2 months
Within 2-month period, Within 2-month period, Within 1-month period, Within 2-month period,THE COORDINATION OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION IN THE UNION AND BEYOND
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Commission can take
decision on compatibility
with EC law and require
amendment or withdrawal
of draft measure
Commission can take
decision on compatibility
with EC law and require
amendment or
withdrawal of draft
measure
Commission can make
public detailed opinion
Commission can take
decision (after consulting
committee of NRAs) on
compatibility with EC law
and require amendment or
withdrawal of draft measure
If no Commission decision
(or if positive decision),
NRA can adopt measure
If no Commission
decision (or if positive
decision), NRA can adopt
measure
If no Commission opinion
(or after opinion), NRA
can adopt measure
If no Commission decision
(or if positive decision), NRA
can adopt measure
If Commission decision
requires amendment or
withdrawal, NRA must
comply
If Commission decision
requires amendment or
withdrawal, NRA must
comply
NRA must justify
departure from
Commission opinion and
communicate reasons to
Commission
If Commission decision
requires amendment or
withdrawal, NRA must
comply
Minimum duration:
general comment period
and 1 month
Minimum duration: 1
month or less
Minimum duration: 1
month or less
Minimum duration: 1 month
or less
Maximum duration:
general comment period
and 3 months
Maximum duration: 3
months
Maximum duration: 2
months
Maximum duration: 3 months
Similarly, as regards emergency decisions by NRAs (Art. 6(5) of the Framework
Directive), the common position would do away with the possibility of review by the
Commission, as found in the Commission proposal (to which the EP did not put forward
amendments).
Overall, the amended proposal of the Commission and the outcome of the 1
st reading in
the EP are fairly similar, the EP having essentially attempted to streamline and shorten
the procedure proposed by the Commission. The Council holds a very different view,
pursuant to which the NRAs would not be subject to any binding review at EC level.
As a preliminary matter, the CEPS Working Party is well aware that broader
institutional considerations are also at play here, which might lead to institutions taking
certain positions as a matter of principle. Nonetheless, it urges the institutions not to
make the communications sector suffer again because of broader considerations. Once
already, at a earlier phase of liberalisation, an important piece of legislation was delayed
on account of an inter-institutional conflict.
15 Furthermore, member states have already
agreed for a long time, in order to achieve the internal market, to comply with much
more constraining coordination mechanisms. For instance, under Directive 98/34 of 22
June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of
technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services,
16
which replaced Directive 83/189,
17 the Commission can stop national  legislative
                                                                
15 It will be recalled that a key plank of the current framework, Directive 95/62 (ONP – Voice Telephony)
[1995] OJ L 321/6 was finally adopted on 13 December 1995, more than three years after the original
proposal. A second complete legislative procedure (with few substantial modifications to the proposal)
had been necessary, after the first proposal was rejected by the European Parliament on third reading for
reasons related to comitology.
16 [1998] OJ L 204/37, as amended by Directive 98/48 [1998] OJ L 217/18.
17 [1983] OJ L 109/8.CAVE & LAROUCHE
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procedures. Article 6 of the Framework Directive cannot therefore create much of a
precedent.
In light of the general considerations set out earlier, the common position is inadequate
and dangerous for the internal market, since no binding coordination mechanism is put
in place. It is true that the discretion of NRAs is already curtailed to a significant extent
through substantive provisions, such as Articles 13 and 14 of the Framework Directive
(combined with Articles 8-13 of the Access Directive), which set out a relatively precise
framework for the NRAs to conduct their supervisory activities: market definition and
analysis, determination of SMP and adoption of appropriate measures.
18 The common
position appears to assume that these substantive constraints, combined with the
persuasive weight of a well publicised Commission opinion and the threat of
infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC,
19 would be sufficient to ensure that
national authorities will act in a coordinated fashion. Yet the measures covered by
Article 6 of the Framework Directive are not merely individual decisions – they fall in
the intermediate level mentioned above. Accordingly, coordination is necessary in order
to ensure that the overall effect of regulatory intervention in the various member states
is at all beneficial. In the eyes of the Working Party, the risk of conflicting national
decisions still remains too high to do without some ‘hard’ coordination mechanism.
While in some cases ‘soft’ coordination mechanisms apparently worked – for instance
the treatment of voice over IP under the current regulatory framework,
20 in a number of
key cases they did not work – for instance the unbundling of the local loop.
21 All the
Community institutions are bound to work to reach the objectives of the Treaty,
including first and foremost the internal market. With its rejection of any form of ‘hard’
coordination mechanism, the common position basically fails on that count.
Yet at the same time, some of the arguments made in support of the common position
point to weaknesses in the amended proposal and suggest that some improvements
could be made.
First of all, the coordination procedure of Article 6 of the Framework Directive, as set
out in the amended proposal, involves review and control by the Commission acting
alone. It is understandable that member states might be wary of this, since there are
risks attached to leaving supervisory tasks to the Commission alone. Even if the review
would bear on ‘compatibility with Community law, in particular the objectives of
Article 7 [of the of the Framework Directive]’, it cannot be denied that most of the time,
                                                                
18 As mentioned above, this framework could be improved with a better articulation between the
assessment process (set out in the Framework Directive) and the available remedies (set out in the Access
Directive).
19 It must be underlined that infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC, among other weaknesses,
are much too slow given the speed at which the communications sector evolves. For instance, the
Commission found in 1997 that the French legislation concerning universal service did not correctly
implement applicable EC legislation (as found in Directives 90/388, as amended and 97/33). The
Commission initiated infringement proceedings. At the time of writing, the ECJ judgment is expected
soon (Case C-146/00).
20 See the two Commission communications on the status of voice on the Internet, published at [1998] OJ
C 6/4 and [2000] OJ C 369/3 respectively.
21 Here the Commission began with a recommendation (Recommendation 2000/417 {…}) but, faced with
the inaction of member states, it proposed the adoption of a regulation (Regulation 2887/2000 of 18
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a number of reasonable options will meet that standard for review. The Commission
would thus enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre in the course of its supervisory
powers. The Commission would become a kind of policy-making actor, making its
influence felt through ‘second-line’ review decisions, without however going through
the motions of actually conducting an inquiry. There is some risk that the Commission
would cease to be confronted with the ‘front line’ – i.e. the reactions and objections
from the involved parties in the various member states, and the legal constraints
designed to ensure reliable and accurate decision-making. As mentioned above, national
authorities are closer to the playing field, and any coordination procedure should seek to
preserve that benefit associated with decentralised decision-making. In order to address
that concern, it would seem appropriate at least to include the other NRAs in the review
process, as a sounding board for the Commission, to ensure that it has proper exposure
to the realities of the sector. Within the current principles governing the participation of
member states in the decision-making process of the Commission, the NRAs could for
instance be obligatorily consulted once the Commission indicates that it has serious
doubts about a proposed NRA measure, and before it takes a final decision on that
matter (along the lines of the model prevailing for merger control).
22
Secondly, the coordination procedure set out at Article 6 of the Amended proposal has
been criticised for its length. Indeed, on the assumption that the NRA would turn around
immediately after the general comment period to submit a revised draft to the
Commission, the overall procedure could still last up to the duration of the general
comment period plus 3 additional months. In this respect, the Working Party supports
the amendments put forward by the European Parliament at its first reading of the
Commission proposal, whereby one stage of the procedure of Article 6 is removed,
namely the round of comments by other NRAs. The maximum overall duration of the
procedure is then brought down to 3 months, which appears more palatable. As a
consequence of the EP amendments, however, the role of other NRAs is curtailed. That
loss could be offset if, as proposed above, the other NRAs are involved when the
Commission takes a final decision once it has expressed serious doubts about a draft
measure. Furthermore, it seems to the Working Party that the consultation of other
NRAs could very well be ‘internalised’ at an earlier stage, i.e. when the NRA prepares
its draft measure. As mentioned previously, a national decision taken in isolation
exhibits very few redeeming features as far as regulatory coordination is concerned.
Accordingly, every NRA should be obliged to explain, in any draft measure submitted
to the procedure of Article 6 of the Framework Directive, how it has taken into account
the decisions and the views already expressed by other NRAs (and by the Commission)
and, as the case may be, why it chose not to follow its peers. Such a requirement would
not lengthen the duration of the coordination procedure. One could argue that decision-
making would still be slowed down because NRAs would have more work to
accomplish before releasing a draft measure. Yet it can only be assumed that NRAs are
already conducting  that kind of comparative analysis for the time being. If they do not,
then they should, for reasons already mentioned.
Thirdly, it has been said that the procedure set out in the Amended proposal is too broad
in scope, covering an excessive number of measures to be taken at national level (i.e.
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the measures concerning frequencies, market definition and analysis as well as
departure from the SMP framework), so that the NRAs and the Commission would be
constantly busy with the coordination procedure. However, the scope of the
coordination procedure of Article 6 can hardly be defined in other, perhaps narrower
terms without using vague concepts that could give rise to litigation.
23 The use of a
string of references to other provisions might be the ‘cleanest’ solution. In any event, if
the suggestions made previously are taken on board, the chances that a draft measure
would give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with EC law should be reduced,
so that the procedure of Article 6 of the Framework Directive, while it would remain
applicable to many draft measures, would with time become more of a routine than a
full-time occupation for all those involved.
A further problem remains, however. The coordination procedure of Article 6 of the
Framework Directive is concerned exclusively with the work of NRAs. At the outset, it
was emphasised that other actors also had a say in the regulation of the communications
sector, namely NCAs and national courts. It would be most unfortunate indeed if all the
efforts devoted to designing an efficient coordination procedure at Article 6 of the
Framework Directive would be undermined by conflicting national decisions emanating
from NCAs or national courts.
With respect to NCAs, the procedural framework of EC competition law is currently
being revised. It appears likely that, as part of an overall decentralisation of decision-
making, a mechanism will be put in place whereby the Commission is kept informed of
draft decisions which the NCAs intend to adopt, with the possibility for the Commission
to seize itself of the matter,
24 should it for instance entertain doubts as to the course of
action envisaged by the NCA or find that the matter is of Community interest.
Accordingly, some measure of coordination between the NCAs and the NRAs will take
place through the Commission acting as a supervisory authority in both areas. Yet
efficiency would be improved if the coordination between NCAs and NRAs were done
at an earlier stage, at the national level itself. Article 3(4) of the Framework Directive is
a step in the right direction, since it requires each member state to introduce and publish
procedures for cooperation between its NRA and its NCA. The Framework Directive
could go further. Given that the thrust of the proposed new framework is to bring
sector-specific regulation closer to competition law principles, decisions taken by the
NRA under Article 14 of the Framework Directive, in combination with Articles 8-13
DAI, will rely to a large extent on analysis very similar to that of competition law.
Logic would dictate that these decisions, if anything, should be examined by NCAs as
well to ensure consistency at the national level. By the same token, the risk of
conflicting decisions between member states would be reduced, since it is less likely
that both the NRA and the NCA would, without a strong justification, take a position
that would stray from corresponding authorities in other member states. As a result, an
express requirement that each NRA consult the NCA – or perhaps even obtains a
positive opinion from it – before issuing a draft measure would make the procedure of
                                                                
23 In the Working Document of 27 April 2000, which preceded the original Framework Directive
proposal, the Commission had defined the scope of the procedure of Article 6 by reference to ‘ decisions
which will affect providers of electronic communications networks and services or users’, which depending on the
interpretation could be even broader than the scope of Article 6(2) and ff. in the current proposal.
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Article 6 of the Framework Directive more efficient, by reducing the likelihood that the
Commission would have to intervene at a latter stage.
As regards national courts, it is for constitutional reasons more difficult to ensure the
appropriate level of coordination through the direct intervention of the Commission.
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the of the Framework Directive contains no
provisions along the lines of Article 15 of the proposed Regulation implementing
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. According to that provision, national courts may ask
the Commission for guidance on EC competition law matters. They must forward to the
Commission any judgement where they apply EC competition law. Finally, the
Commission can intervene before the courts on EC competition law matters, more or
less as an amicus curiae. The same could have been done under the new framework for
electronic communications since, in addition to the role national courts could play when
they apply EC competition law,
25 these courts will frequently be called upon to review
decisions made by NRAs. In such cases, the effect of the procedure of Article 6 of the
Framework Directive could be nullified if NRA decisions were overturned by national
courts.
In summary, the Working Party wishes to underline the following points:
§  The coordination procedure provided for at Article 6 of the Framework Directive (in
the Amended proposal) responds to a strong need. The new regulatory framework
cannot do without the possibility of a ‘hard’ intervention by the Commission to
prevent NRAs from going ahead with contradictory or incompatible measures. In
this respect, the Common position is not acceptable;
§  At the same time, care must be taken not to lose the benefits of decision-making at
the national level (learning-by-doing, proximity to the playing field, flexibility and
responsiveness) through an overly long or costly coordination procedure. The WP
supports the amendments put forward by the European Parliament at its first
reading;
§  In addition, the efficiency of the procedure would be enhanced if the NRAs
themselves were entrusted with the task of ensuring coordination at a prior stage,
thereby reducing the risk that the Commission would have to intervene. Before they
publish a draft measure, each NRA should be bound to consult the NCA.
Furthermore, the draft measure should explain how the NRA took the work of other
NRAs (and the Commission) into account, and as the case may be, why it chose to
depart from the results of that work;
§  Similarly, the risk that the Commission would lose touch with the playing field
when exercising its supervisory powers would be reduced by requiring it to consult
with a committee of NRAs after it expressed serious doubts about a draft measure,
before it adopts a final decision;
§  It is unfortunate that the Framework Directive contains no provisions designed to
ensure the consistency of national court decisions (to the extent possible within
constitutional limits) along the lines of the provisions of the proposed Regulation
implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
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3.3 Coordination with respect to frequency spectrum matters
26
Matters relating to frequency spectrum are split between three instruments under the
proposed new regulatory framework:
§  In Article 8 of the Framework Directive, member states are bound to manage
spectrum in accordance with the objectives of EC electronic communications
regulation, and to ensure that allocation
27 and assignment
28 are done objectively,
transparently, without discrimination and according to proportionate criteria. NRAs
must then work to foster the harmonisation of use of radio spectrum across the EC.
§  In the Authorisation Directive, a series of provisions concerns the use of rights of
use for radio frequencies (Article 5-6), the procedures for limiting the number of
rights of use and for their grant (Article 7) as well as compliance with harmonised
rules on the assignment of frequencies (Article 8).
§  The Decision on Radio Spectrum provides for an EC-level procedure to ensure
policy coordination and produce harmonised conditions for availability and use of
spectrum.
29
It is well known that until now the member states have been very reluctant to deal with
radio spectrum issues within the framework of the European Community. The proposals
described above mark a great progress, since a more permanent forum would be put in
place, which could then help to develop a general European approach to spectrum
policy, as opposed to the ad hoc discussions that have been taking place so far as issues
arose (GSM, S-PCS, UMTS), without any overall design.
Nevertheless, the Working Party is concerned that some important aspects of radio
spectrum policy would remain uncoordinated. The amended proposal of the
Commission (supported by the EP on that point) provides that national decisions
concerning the use of auctions or administrative pricing for spectrum (Art. 8(3)
Framework Directive), the transfer of spectrum rights (Art. 8(4)) or the allocation of
rights to use spectrum (Art. 8(6)), will be subject to the coordination procedure of
Article 6 of the Framework Directive, discussed previously. In its common position,
however, the Council removes these decisions from the ambit of the procedure of
Article 6 of the Framework Directive, so that no mechanism is available to ensure the
coordination of national decisions on those points.
The UMTS experience clearly shows the dangers of a lack of coordination at European
level. The first member states started to award UMTS licenses at a time when it was not
even known how the rest of the member states would proceed, thus making it very
difficult for interested firms – most of which took a European view on the UMTS
licensing process – to plan their actions. For many firms and observers, UMTS licensing
became a ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ process, at odds with the objectives of the internal
market.
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For the Working Party, it is imperative that EC-level coordination be improved in future
spectrum assignment processes. The procedure set out at Article 6 of the Framework
Directive appears well suited for that purpose – especially in light of the modifications
proposed above. In practical terms, this would mean that the national authorities, when
dealing with spectrum matters, would have to pay attention to developments in other
member states, with the threat of an adverse Commission decision if they do not do so.
Given that a number of possible avenues are open and can be justified, it is unlikely that
member states would find themselves forced to follow a single solution. For instance,
spectrum allocation can be done through auctions or beauty contests (each of which in
turn knows of many variants), as is expressly recognised in Article 8(3) of the
Framework Directive (amended proposal). As long as their choice of timing and
procedure does not impair the internal market, member states should thus retain a range
of options. There is therefore no reason to exclude decisions to be taken under Article
8(3), 8(4) and 8(5) of the Framework Directive from the scope of Article 6.
Furthermore, the free band part of the radio spectrum is now being frequently used for
wireless LAN and broadband connections. As this part of the spectrum is very limited,
there is an evident risk that, in populated areas, it would be quickly monopolised.
Consequently, in order to secure healthy competition, the Commission should
encourage NRAs to ensure that these areas are served by providers whose aim is to offer
an open network where consumers can choose between several operators.28
C HAPTER 4
THE INTERNAL MARKET
he pan-European and global dimension of the communications sector was a
recurring theme in the previous sections. Indeed, achieving the Internal Market in
the communications sector is of strategic significance for the EU, not just because
communications as such is one of the leading sectors of the European economy, but
also because the whole of the economy benefits from a healthy and efficient
communications sector. It suffices here to recall the ambitious objective set by the Lisbon
European Council – for Europe ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion’.
In spite of that, the integration of the national markets into an internal market remains the
dark spot on the track record of telecommunications liberalisation. The run-up to
liberalisation, one of the success stories of the EC in the 1990s, appeared to have been
driven more by a willingness to remove legal monopolies than by the pursuit of internal
market objectives. As a result, the current picture of the telecommunications sector in the
EC tends to show 15 fully liberalised markets more than a single open market.
It is true that the starting point was almost as far from integration as one could imagine,
with national monopolists dominating their respective ring-fenced national markets. Still the
onset of competition, combined with ‘technological leaps’ (rise of the internet and of
mobile telephony), contributes to reduce the overall influence of incumbents on the
evolution of their respective home markets. By the same token, incumbents also become
more interested in developments abroad. The legal framework should then strive to
encourage firms to operate at a pan-European and even global level, so as to foster the
integration of markets.
The Working Party is very concerned that the internal market will remain forgotten – or
even ignored – in the new regulatory framework. It is not sufficient to make the national
markets more competitive; they must also be better integrated. In a context of globalisation
and convergence, fifteen small markets, however buoyant, just will not cut it. So far, the
European industry has prospered most, and European consumers have benefited most in the
areas where serious efforts were made to achieve the internal market – witness mobile
communications until recently. By the same token, a loss of focus on the internal market –
as seems to be happening with UMTS – could entail a loss of those advantages.
4.1 Licensing and authorisation regime
The resulting Directive 97/13 of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general
authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services
30 was not
a huge success. It did introduce some discipline in national licensing practices, but it still
left too much discretion for member states to require individual licenses before offering
certain services.
31 Since then, the industry was heard over and over again complaining about
the diverging and contradictory licensing regimes. Fees, procedures, duration, conditions,
scope, all the main elements of the licensing regime differ from one member state to the
                                                                
30 [1997] OJ L 117/15.
31 See in particular Article 7(2) of Directive 97/13, according to which ‘the provision of publicly available
voice telephony services, the establishment and provision of public telecommunications networks as well
as other networks involving the use of radio frequencies may be subject to individual licences’.
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other, leaving firms with significant costs and inconvenience when they want to operate at a
pan-European level.
In the proposed Authorisation Directive,
32 the same approach is brought one step further.
Individual licenses are removed altogether, so that electronic communications services and
networks can only be submitted to general authorisations (if anything).
33 Member states
may still require firms to obtain rights of use for frequencies or numbers or rights of way.
34
In the eyes of the Working Party, the proposed Authorisation Directive marks a clear
improvement over the current situation. At the same time, it calls for a few remarks.
First of all, the few areas left where member states retain the ability to require individual
applications for authorisations (rights of use), namely frequencies and numbers, also beg for
coordination at the EC level. For instance, the recent round of license awards for UMTS
suffered from a total lack of coordination. As a result, the mobile communications sector is
likely to remain broken down into national markets (among other negative impacts).
Accordingly, as already discussed previously, the proposed Directive cannot fulfil its aims
if it is not accompanied by an adequate coordination mechanism for the areas – most of all
frequencies – where member states retain the power to require individual applications (for
rights of use).
Secondly, even in the absence of individual license requirements, firms will continue to be
hampered by 15 different general authorisation schemes. In particular, there is no indication
as to the scope of the general authorisation: there could be one general authorisation for all
electronic communications networks and services, or a series of authorisations concerning
specific networks or services.
35 In the latter case, the scope of the service- or network-
related authorisations could vary from one member state to the other (i.e. because
definitions or interpretations are slightly different), thereby perpetuating problems for the
industry and undoing the progress made with the proposed Authorisation Directive. This
issue has been left out of consideration so far, but care should be taken that member states
align the scope of their respective general authorisation schemes to the greatest extent
possible.
4.2 Coordination with other directives
The internal market also comes out short when one considers the proposed new electronic
communications regulatory framework together with other closely related EC legislation.
Inconsistencies within EC legislation mean that the benefits of the internal market are
significantly reduced.
For instance, the general approach of the new framework is not entirely compatible with
that followed in other sectors, such as audio-visual media and e-commerce. The new
framework – like the current one – is geared to produce 15 harmonised sets of national
regulation. Firms can then operate with some level of certainty that they will face similar
regulation from one member state to the other. In contrast, EC legislation on audio-visual
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33 Ibid., Art. 3(2).
34 Ibid., Art. 5.
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media
36 and e-commerce
37 rests on principles of mutual recognition and home-state control.
There the national regulatory frameworks are not necessarily so similar, but a firm need
only comply with the regulation applicable in its member state of establishment (with some
exceptions). In a context of convergence, this leads to awkward situations, where a single
firm is concerned with the law of a single member state for its operations in the audio-visual
or e-commerce sector, while it must ensure compliance with the law of every member state
where it conducts ‘electronic communications’ activities. What is more, the definitions
which delineate the scope of each piece of EC legislation are not entirely exclusive of each
other; for instance, a single service could be both an ‘electronic communications service’
(falling under the new regulatory framework) and an ‘information society service’ (to which
the Directive on E-Commerce applies). The same type of inconsistency is also present
between the E-Commerce Directive and other measures, including the proposed directive
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services,
38 which do not follow the
home-state control principle.
The same pattern can be seen with the treatment of the distinction between ‘electronic
communications’ and content. On the one hand, in the definition section, services involving
content are excluded from the definition of ‘electronic communications services’, which
would imply that they are entirely left out of the new regulatory framework. On the other
hand, services such as TV broadcasting qualify as ‘services delivered using electronic
communications networks and services’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of the proposed
Framework Directive,
39 where it is stated more broadly that the proposed directive would be
‘without prejudice to obligations imposed by national law in accordance with Community
law or by Community law in respect of services delivered using electronic communications
networks and services.’ On that account, the new regulatory framework could thus
potentially affect services involving content, but not so as to supersede other laws and
regulations (including Directive 89/552). It seems that this latter approach, which does not
seek to isolate content and communications hermetically, would be more advantageous,
leaving the regulatory framework to apply to services building on electronic
communications when suitable and adequate, while letting rules that are specific to those
services prevail. Indeed, it must not be forgotten that there is more to ‘content’ than audio-
visual content: whereas a communications/content distinction could perhaps be applied with
a limited measure of success when it comes to A-V content, it is impossible and counter-
productive to seek to enforce a strong distinction between financial services, for instance, as
‘content’ and the communications networks and services over which these financial services
are provided.
For the rest, the proposals are silent on content. The Commission simply mentioned in a
recital that ‘[t]he separation between the regulation of transmission and the regulation of
content does not prejudice the taking into account of the links existing between them’,
40 but
included very few specific provisions to that end. As mentioned in the proposed Framework
Directive, Directive 89/552 remains outside the scope of the new framework.
41 A few
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38 See the amended proposal [2000] OJ C 177E/21. The proposal is currently before the Council, which
has not been able to reach political agreement on it.
39 As stated in Recital 7.
40 Ibid.
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content-related provisions come through the inclusion within the new proposals of Directive
95/47 on the use of standards for the transmission of television signals.
42 For instance, the
proposed Access Directive provides for broadcasters to be granted fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory access to the conditional access services of pay TV or other operators.
43
In addition, the proposed Universal Service Directive contains a provision on ‘must-carry’
obligations in Article 26, whose aim is not to impose such rules at the EC level, but rather
to establish an EC-level framework to assess the validity of member state rules; this
provision does not put content providers in a privileged position vis-à-vis network
operators. In a set of proposals that otherwise seek to be technology-neutral, the Universal
Service Directive remains tied to specific technological models, as is evidenced by Article
26. The proposal defines ‘must-carry obligations’ restrictively as the ‘transmission of
broadcasts’. If member states can justifiably impose the transmission of broadcasts in the
public interest, under certain conditions, then in the era of convergence and digitalisation,
they equally should be able to impose ‘must-list’ (for electronic programme guides) or
‘must-link’ (for Internet portals) obligations, for instance. The amendments to Article 26(1)
proposed by the European Parliament sought to remedy that weakness,
44 but the other
institutions dismissed them. The Commission justified its position by arguing that
‘regulation of the due prominence aspects of EPGs and navigators forms part of content
regulation and this is now recognised in [Article 6(4)]of the Access Directive’,
45 which
reads (in the Common position): ‘Conditions applied in accordance with this Article are
without prejudice to the ability of member states to impose obligations in relation to the
presentational aspect of electronic programme guides and similar listing and navigation
facilities.’
46 In the name of the content/communications distinction, the extension of ‘must-
carry’ to EPGs and portals is thus left to a vague ‘without prejudice’ clause, whereas it
could have been brought under the scope of Article 26 of the Universal Service Directive,
which provides a canvas to ensure that member state measures remain in line with EC law.
The result will be an unnecessary legal vacuum.
The overall scheme of the proposed new regulatory framework therefore leads to a clear
distinction between ‘electronic communications’ and content, the new regulatory
framework being (self-)focussed on the former and leaving the latter almost entirely out of
consideration. Providers of ‘content’ – audio-visual or other – are thus put in the same
position as any other user of electronic communications networks and services. In their
                                                                
42 Directive 95/47 of 24 October 1995 on the use of standards for the transmission of television signals
[1995] OJ L 281/51.
43 See Art. 6(1) and Annex I(1). The scope of these access rights can be extended to application
programme interfaces (APIs) and electronic programme guides (EPGs), pursuant to Art. 6(2) and Annex
I(2).
44 In addition, the EP proposed to restrict ‘must-carry’ obligations to broadcasts ‘in pursuit of a public
service broadcasting remit’, which appears logical given that ‘must-carry’ obligations are exceptional and
must be justified by a public interest objective. That amendment was rejected by the Commission because
it would exclude ‘commercial television channels that fulfil a cultural diversity criterion’ (see the
amended proposal); the reasoning of the Commission rests on a confusion between ‘broadcasters with a
public-service remit’, which can be in either public or private hands (see the example of the French TF1,
which is subject to a number of public-service obligations) and ‘public broadcasters’ which are not
privately-owned. The wording of the European Parliament amendment refers to the nature of the remit
and not to the ownership of the broadcaster, and as such the objections of the Commission are not
founded.
45 See the comments of the Commission on the common position at 11.
46  Common position, Article 6(4).CAVE & LAROUCHE
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relationship with operators of such networks and services, they are left to rely generally on
EC competition law. If anything, major competition law cases such as AOL/Time Warner
47
and  Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram
48 only underline the need for some regulatory regime
concerning the relationship between content and delivery networks, since that issue will
arise again in subsequent cases, and it cannot always be settled on a piecemeal basis.
Here as well, it seems that the Community institutions
49 are quick to draw comforting lines
through legal definitions and then neglect the overall consistency of EC legislation. The
Working Party calls upon the Community institutions to try to overcome organisational
difficulties caused in large part by the need to divide work amongst persons and groups
within a large organisation. The various strands of EC law should not meet only on the
receiving end, when citizens and businesses must deal with them; Community institutions
should pay more attention to the overall consistency of EC legislation in a sector where
boundaries are in practice few and fluid.
                                                                
47 Decision of 11 October 2000, Case COMP/M.1845 (europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html).
48 Decision of 13 October 2000, Case COMP/M.2050 (europa.eu.int/comm/competition/index_en.html).
49 Except perhaps the European Parliament, which sought to improve upon the relationship between
‘electronic communications’ and content with its 1
st reading amendments, some of which were taken over
in the Amended proposal.33
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Framework Directive
Full title: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services
Commission proposal: COM(2000)393 (12 July 2000), [2000] OJ C 365E/198
ESC Opinion: [2001] OJ C 123/56 (6 February 2001)
EP – 1
st reading: A5-0053/2001 (1 March 2001), available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Amended Commission proposal: COM(2001)380 (4 July 2001), available at:
europa.eu.int/eur-lex
Common position: 17 September 2001, available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Commission opinion on Common position: SEC(2001)1365 (18 September 2001),
available at: www.europarl.eu.int (in Annex to common position)
Access Directive
Full title: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities
Commission proposal: COM(2000)384 (12 July 2000), [2000] OJ C 365E/215
ESC Opinion: [2001] OJ C 123/50 (24 January 2001)
EP – 1
st reading: A5-0061/2001 (1 March 2001), available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Amended Commission proposal: COM(2001)369 (4 July 2001), available at:
europa.eu.int/eur-lex
Common position: 17 September 2001, available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Commission opinion on Common position: SEC(2001)1409 (18 September 2001),
available at www.europarl.eu.int (in Annex to common position)
Authorisation Directive
Full title: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation
of electronic communications networks and services
Commission proposal: COM(2000)386 (12 July 2000), [2000] OJ C 365E/230
ESC Opinion: [2001] OJ C 123/55 (24 January 2001)
EP – 1
st reading: A5-0062/2001 (1 March 2001), available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Amended Commission proposal: COM(2001)372 (4 July 2001), available at:
europa.eu.int/eur-lexCAVE & LAROUCHE
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Common position: 17 September 2001, available at www.europarl.eu.int
Commission opinion on Common position: SEC(2001)1411 (18 September 2001),
available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Universal Service Directive
Full title: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on universal service
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services
Commission proposal: COM(2000)392 (12 July 2000), [2000] OJ C 365E/238
COR Opinion: [2001] OJ C 144/60 (14 December 2000)
ESC Opinion: [2001] OJ C 139/15 (1 March 2001)
EP – 1
st reading: A5-0202/2001 (13 June 2001), available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Amended Commission proposal: COM(2001)503 (14 September 2001), available at:
europa.eu.int/eur-lex
Common position: 17 September 2001, available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Commission opinion on Common position: SEC(2001)1407 (18 September 2001),
available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Privacy Directive
Full title: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector
Commission proposal: COM(2000)385 (12 July 2000), [2000] OJ C 365E/223
ESC Opinion: [2001] OJ C 123/53 (24 January 2001)
Decision on Radio Spectrum
Full title: Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a regulatory
framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community
Commission proposal: COM(2000)407 (12 July 2000), [2000] OJ C 365E/256
ESC Opinion: [2001] OJ C 123/61 (24 January 2001)
EP – 1
st reading: A5-0232/2001 (5 July 2001), available at: www.europarl.eu.int
Amended Commission proposal: COM(2001)524 (18 September 2001), available at:
europa.eu.int/eur-lex35
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